This paper analyzes the problem of a benevolent planner wishing to control a population of heterogeneous agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This is equivalent to a deterministic control problem in which the state variable is the cross-sectional distribution. We show how, in continuous time, this problem can be broken down into a dynamic programming equation plus the law of motion of the distribution, and we introduce a new numerical algorithm to solve it.
Introduction
Optimal control is an essential tool in economics and finance. In optimal control, a planner determines the evolution of a vector of control variables in order to maximize a certain optimality criterion. The state of the system is typically characterized by a finite number of state variables. 1 Some systems of interest are nevertheless composed of a very large number of heterogeneous agents; an economy, for example, is composed of millions of different households and firms and a network may contain thousands of nodes. In these cases, assuming a continuous distribution of state variables seems to be a reasonable approximation to the real problem under consideration.
The aim of this paper is to analyze optimal control problems in which there is a continuum of heterogeneous agents. The state of each of these agents is characterized by a finite set of variables which follow a controllable stochastic process, that is, there exists a vector of controls that allows the planner to modify the individual states. The state dynamics also depend on the evolution of a set of aggregate variables. We consider a benevolent social planner who maximizes an aggregate welfare criterion.
We focus on the continuous time version of the problem. The key feature of working in continuous time is that the evolution of the state distribution across agents can be characterized by a partial differential equation (PDE) known as the Kolmogorov forward (KF) equation. 2 Despite the random evolution of each individual state, the dynamics of the distribution are deterministic due to the Law of Large Numbers. Thanks to this, the control of an infinite number of agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks can be analyzed as the control of a deterministic distribution that evolves according to the KF equation, subject to the aggregate −or market clearing− conditions. The main contribution of the paper is to present the necessary conditions for a solution to this problem. These conditions are characterized by a system of two coupled PDEs, the planner's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the KF equation, plus the market clearing conditions. The planner's HJB equation is a PDE that determines the marginal social value of an agent being in a certain state and the KF equation describes the distributional dynamics. This characterization of the problem allows the comparison with the decentralized solution or competitive equilibrium, in which each atomistic agent chooses her own controls without taking into account their impact on the other agents. The competitive equilibrium is also composed by a system of coupled PDEs: the individual HJB and the KF equation. The difference is that the planner's HJB equation includes a term reflecting the impact of individual policies on the aggregate distribution, whereas the individual HJB does not. By comparing the two HJB equations we provide a condition to verify whether the competitive allocation and the planned economy are equal.
control problems with heterogeneous agents. Many continuous-time models with heterogeneousagents can be solved explicitly due to the particular set of assumptions that they make. 3 In contrast, Achdou et al. (2015) provide an efficient numerical strategy based on finite difference methods in order to solve more general problems. 4 Here we extend this methodology to the case of optimal control. Our algorithm solves the planner's HJB, the KF equation and finds the Lagrange multipliers associated with the market clearing conditions. The methodology presented here allows analyzing a variety of problems in economics.
As an application, we analyze the constrained efficient allocation in an incomplete-market economy à la Aiyagari (1994) with stochastic-life agents. Recent research by Piketty and Saez (2003) , Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) and others has documented how since the 1970s there has been a progressive rise in top wealth inequality and in the stock of capital in several advanced economies, which in cases such as the Unites States may be close to the historical maximum. This has led to researchers such as Piketty (2014) or Atkinson (2015) to propose redistributive policies such as wealth taxation as a way to reduce wealth inequality. Notwithstanding, the increase in wealth inequality observed in the data is not necessarily negative from a social welfare perspective. It depends on which is the "optimal" amount of capital in the economy and on its distribution: it is not obvious that the society as a whole is better-off in a low-capital more equal situation compared to a high-capital more unequal one, for example.
We apply the optimal control techniques discused above to try to shed light on this issue by studying the optimal constrained-efficient wealth distribution in an Aiyagari economy with stochastic-lifetimes as in the "perpetual youth" models of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) . The introduction of stochastic lifetimes generates a stationary wealth distribution with an upper tail following a power law, a well-known empirical fact. 5 The degree of wealth inequality, defined by the right tail exponent, depends on the difference between the return on capital and the long-run growth rate, (r − g) , as discussed by Piketty (2014). The constrained efficient allocation is defined as the one in which a benevolent social planner chooses the individual levels of consumption, while respecting all budget constraints. As discussed by Diamond (1967) and Davila et al. (2012) , this is a notion of efficiency that does not allow the planner to directly overcome the friction implied by missing markets. 6 This concept is related to 4 Also see Rocheteau et al (2015) who propose a related incomplete-markets framework and are able to obtain a number of qualitative results. 5 The emergence of a power-law in the wealth distribution has been analyzed in a number of previous papers, such as Wold and Whittle (1957), Benhabib and Bisin (2007), Benhabib, Bisin and Zhu (2011, 2015a, 2015b) , Piketty and Zucman (2015), Jones (2015) or Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) , among others. Here the power law is due to the combination of random exponential lifetimes and a lower bound to the wealth distribution. A non-microfounded approach to power laws using this mechanism is discussed in Gabaix et al. (2015) . 6 If the planner was able to fully redistribute across agents, the first-best allocation would be degenerated as a
The second contribution of the paper is to introduce a numerical algorithm to solve optimal utilitarian planner would provide the same consumption level to every agent irrespective of her assets.
that of a pecuniary externality. In the model agents do not internalize the effect of their individual saving decisions on interest rates and wages. We show how the model is constrained inefficient: the market economy is undercapitalized compared to the social optimum. The optimal allocation also features more wealth inequality than the market economy as the reduction in interest rates due to higher capital in the social optimum is not enough to compensate for the increase in aggregate savings by wealthy households. Related literature. Our paper relates to the recent discrete-time literature, such as Davila et al. (2012) and Acikgoz (2014), analyzing problems in which a planner has to choose the controls to be applied to a continuous population of heterogeneous agents. Davila et al. (2012) analyze the constrained efficient allocation in an Aiyagari economy with infinite lifetimes using calculus of variations. Acikgoz (2014) builds on this approach in order to solve the Ramsey problem in a similar model. The continuous-time approach presented here differs from those papers in two main aspects. The first is that we characterize the problem in terms of the planner HJB instead of the Euler equation. More precisely, we show how the planner's problem can be broken into individual HJB equations in which the value function for each person is his marginal social value under an optimal plan. The HJB equation for this marginal social value can then be compared with the HJB equation in the competitive equilibrium, thereby obtaining an easily interpretable formula that precisely characterizes the pecuniary externality causing the planner's allocation to differ from the equilibrium one. The second lies in the approach to compute the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution. Traditional discrete-time methods either simulate a large number of agents by Montecarlo methods or discretize the state-space. In contrast, in continuous time the distributional dynamics are characterized by a partial differential equation: the KF equation. We take advantage of this fact and develop an efficient and flexible computational algorithm using finite-difference methods that applies to a wide class of planning problems in which a distribution is the relevant state variable.
Our paper is also linked to a couple of recent papers that analyze optimal control problems in continuous time.
7 Lucas and Moll (2014) analyze an optimal planning problem subject to the law of motion of the aggregate distribution. Their formulation nevertheless does not consider the possibility of including aggregate constraints, such as market clearing conditions, which are prevalent in most economic problems. Here instead we analyze the general problem. This requires the use of functional analysis, in particular of optimization techniques in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, in order to derive the necessary conditions for a solution. Another continuous-time paper 7 In additon, it relates to the emerging literature in mathematics analyzing mean field control problems. The name is borrowed from the mean-field approximation in statistical physics, in which the effect on any given individual of all the other individuals is approximated by a single averaged effect. A survey may be found in Bensoussan, Frehse and Yam (2013) .
that analyzes the optimal allocation with heterogeneous agents is Alfonso and Lagos (2015). They assume that their state variables can only take a finite number of values, in contrast to a continuum, and thus they can avoid the problem of optimization in infinite-dimensional spaces that we analyze here. In many applications it is more natural to work with continuous state variables, for example in models of wealth distribution like the one analyzed in the present paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the problem of computing the constrained-efficient allocation in an incomplete-markets economy with stochastic lifetimes as a motivation. In section 3 we analyze the general case and present the main results. In section 4 we introduce the numerical algorithm and apply it to solve the problem posed in section 2. Finally, in section 5 we conclude.
2 The constrained-efficient allocation in an incompletemarkets economy with stochastic lifetimes
We introduce here a model that extends the incomplete-markets economy à la Aiyagari (1994) with stochastic-life agents as in the "perpetual youth" models of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) . Our aim is to analyze the optimal constrained efficient allocation in the sense of Davila et al. (2012) , as it is explained below.
Individuals
Let (Σ, F, {F t } , P) be a filtered probability space. There is a continuum of mass unity of agents that are heterogeneous in their wealth A and labor productivity z. The duration of an agent's life is uncertain. Lifetimes τ are stochastic and governed by an exponential random variable with mean 1/η. At the time of death each agent is replaced by a single child so that the size of the population is constant.
Agents have standard preferences over utility flows from future consumption C t discounted at rate ρ ≥ 0 :
We assume CRRA preferences, such that u (C) =
. Individuals have no intergenerational altruism and thus they purchase an annuity in a perfectly competitive insurance market that pays them a flow ηA t in exchange of taking control of all the assets when the agent dies.
8 Each agent agent's wealth evolves according to
where r t is the interest rate. Agents also face a borrowing limit,
where Ā t ≤ 0. The agent's labor productivity evolves stochastically over time on a bounded interval [z,z] with z≥ 0, according to a bounded Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
where B t is a F t −adapted idiosyncratic Brownian motion and θ,ẑ and σ are positive constants.
We impose an additional restriction so that the "natural borrowing limit" is not binding:
The optimal value function results in
subject to evolution of individual wealth (2).
Firms
There is a representative firm with a constant returns to scale production function
where K is the aggregate capital, L is aggregate labor and Z is TFP. The lattest evolves deterministically according to
where g is the constant long-run growth rate of the economy. Capital depreciates at rate δ K . Since factor markets are competitive, the interest rate and wage are given by
Competitive equilibrium
As described above, agents leave no bequest. New agents begin with an initial debt Ā t as we assume that they had to borrow in order to finance their education. 10 They are also born with a labor productivity level of z. The state of the economy is the joint distribution of wealth and labor, f (t, A, z). The dynamics of the distribution are given by the Kolmogorov Forward (KF) equation
is the outflow of agents due to death and the term ηδ 0 =
is the inflow of newborn agents with wealth Ā t and productivity z. 11 The distribution should satisfy the normalization
The total amount of capital supplied in the economy equals the total amount of wealth
and the total amount of labor supplied in the economy equals one, L = 1.
We define a competitive equilibrium in this economy.
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium)
A competitive equilibrium is composed by a pair of factor prices W (t), r(t), an aggregate capital stock K(t), a value function V (t, A, z), a consumption policy C(t, A, z) and a distribution f (t, A, z) such that 10 We could have assumed as well that newborns have zero initial assets. It would make no qualitative difference and only a minor quantitative difference for the numerical results presented below. 11 δ (·) is the Dirac delta, not to confound with the depreciation rate. The Dirac delta is a distribution or generalized function such that
A heuristic characterization is that
1. Given W, r and f , V is the solution of the individual's problem (4) and the optimal control is C.
2. Given K, firms maximize their profits and prices are given by (5).
3. Given W, r and C, f is the solution of the KF equation (6).
4. Given f and K, the capital market (7) clears.
Stationary distribution
Let's analyze the ergodic case in which the aggregate distribution is time-independent. In this case, non-stationary variables such as capital, wages, wealth or consumption grow at a rate g.
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We detrend them by dividing by e gt . Let c t ≡ C t e −gt , preferences can be expressed as
and the evolution of individual detrended wealth a t ≡ A t e −gt follows
where w ≡ W t e −gt is the constant detrended wage. Notice the term (r − g) in the drift of the wealth, as underlined by Piketty (2014). We assume that the borrowing constraint is of the form
with 0 ≤ φ ≤z w r . The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of the individual problem is
And the KF equation
12 Non-stationary variables were previously defined with capital letters.
Factor prices are given by
where k ≡ K t e −gt is the constant detrended capital.
Finally, the market clearing condition results in
The proposition below shows how the Aiyagari model with exogenous deaths features a fat-tail ergodic wealth distribution.
Proposition 1 Provided that ρ + γη > (1 − γ) r and r > r * ≡ ρ + γg, the stationary wealth distribution is characterized by an asymptotic power law, f (a) ∼ a −(1+ζ) , with tail exponent
Proof. See Appendix A. The insight that the combination of a Blanchard-Yaari setting with an optimal consumption problem produces a power-law distribution is due to Benhabib and Bisin (2007). Our result differs from theirs in three regards. First, we analyze a stochastic general equilibrium incomplete-market case whereas Benhabib and Bisin work in a complete-market deterministic environment (except for the death probability) where interest rates and wages are exogenous. Second, we assume that agents only care about their own utility and hence we do not consider any "joy of giving" preferences for bequests. Finally, we work with general CRRA utility instead of the particular case of log-utility.
Constrained efficiency
We investigate the optimal allocation of wealth in this economy. Due to heterogeneity, our optimality criterion requires some degree of interpersonal utility comparison. In line with most of the literature, we consider a utilitarian social welfare function (SWF) so that the objective of the social planner is ex-ante expected utility. This amounts to a probability-weighted average: the planner is "behind the veil of ignorance." In addition, it is necessary to specify which degree of redistribution is possible for the planner. If the planner was able to fully redistribute across agents, the first-best allocation would be degenerated as a utilitarian planner would provide the same consumption level to every agent irrespective of his or her assets. This allocation does not seem too interesting as a practical benchmark. Instead, we follow Davila et al. (2012) and focus on the study of the constrained-efficient allocation. In this case the planner is constrained to consider allocations with zero net transfers across individuals. The question is whether the planner can improve on the market allocation by simply commanding different levels of consumption, while respecting all individual budget constraints. This issue is closely related to the existence of a pecuniary externality, typically present in this kind of models: individual agents do not internalize that their saving decisions affect the aggregate amount of capital, which affects the rest of agents through wages and interest rates. The planner does take this effect into account when computing the optimal individual saving decision and thus the optimal wealth allocation.
The problem of the planner is to choose individual consumption c (t, ·) across agents in order to maximize the discounted aggregate utility
= max
subject to the law of motion of the aggregate distribution (10), to the factor prices (11) and to the market clearing condition (12). Here J (f (0, ·)) is the optimal value functional, as its state variable is a distribution f (0, ·) .
Notice that the planner gives the same weight to every agent irrespective of its age. This contrasts with the SWF chosen in Benhabib and Bisin (2007) which only considers the welfare of the agents alive at an arbitrary time. Notice also that the planner discounts future aggregate utility flows at the same rate of individual agents ρ, not at rate (ρ + η) . The theoretical and numerical approach to solve problem (14) will be described in the next two sections.
General approach
In this section we analyze a general optimal control problem with heterogeneous agents and provide the necessary conditions for a solution.
Competitive equilibrium 3.1.1 Individual problem.
We consider a continuous-time infinite-horizon economy. Let (Σ, F, {F t } , P) be a filtered probability space. There is a continuum of unit mass of ex-ante identical agents indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] . The duration of an agent's life is uncertain. Death is governed by a Poisson random variable with rate η. At the time of death each agent is replaced by a single child so that the size of the population is constant.
Let B j t be a n-dimensional F t -adapted Brownian motion and X j t ∈ Ω denote the state of an agent j at time t ∈ [0, ∞). The state evolves according to a multidimensional Itô process of the form dX
where X j t is a reflected process bounded in the domain Ω ⊂ R n , μ ∈ R m is a m−dimensional vector of policy variables and Z t ∈ R p is a deterministic p-dimensional vector of aggregate variables. Here the instantaneous drift b (·) and volatility σ (·) are measurable functions,
. 13 In the Appendix B we provide some technical assumptions to ensure the existence of a solution of the stochastic differential equation (15). The policy vector μ is an F t -adapted Markov control. The control μ(t, x) is admissible if for any initial point (t, x) such that X j t = x the stochastic differential equation (15) has a unique solution.
14 We denote M as the space of all admissible controls contained in the set of all Markov controls. The control strategy is the same for every agent, but it depends on time and on the specific state of the agent. Agents maximize their discounted utility. The optimal value function V (t, x) is defined as
subject to (15), 15 where utility u(x, μ) ∈ C 1 (Ω × R m ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave and ρ > 0 is a constant. The transversality condition is
The solution to this problem is given by a value function V (t, x) and a control strategy μ(t, x) that satisfy the HJB equation
13 C k (Ω) is the set of all k-times continuously differentiable functions on Ω.
14 This is guaranteed if
where A is the infinitesimal generator of process (15):
The infinitesimal generator of a stochastic process is a partial differential operator that encodes the main information about the process. It is typically defined as Af (x) = lim t↓0
Aggregate distribution and aggregate variables.
Assume that the transition measure of X t with initial valuex 0 has a density f (t,
The initial distribution of X t at time t = 0 is f (0, x) = f 0 (x). We assume than the new cohorts of agents are born with an initial state x 0 . The dynamics of the distribution of agents f (t, x) are given by the Kolmogorov Forward (KF) equation
where A * is the adjoint operator of A :
and δ x 0 = δ (x − x 0 ) is the Dirac delta centered at x 0 .
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The vector of aggregate variables is determined by a system of p equations:
where
. These equations are typically the market clearing conditions.
We may define a competitive equilibrium in this economy.
Definition 2 (Competitive equilibrium)
A competitive equilibrium is a vector of aggregate variables Z t , a value function V (t, x), a control μ(t, x) and a distribution f (t, x) such that 1. Given Z t and f (t, x), V (t, x) is the solution of the HJB equation (18) and the optimal control is μ(t, x).
2. Given μ(t, x) and Z t , f (t, x) is the solution of the KF equation (20, 21) .
3. Given μ(t, x) and f (t, x), the aggregate variables Z t satisfy the market clearing conditions (22) .
Example 1 In the notation of this section, the example of section 2 can be expressed as
where ā < -φ and κξ φ (a) ∈ C 1 (ā , ∞) is a penalty function that equals zero if a ≥ −φ and approximates κ if a < −φ. We let 0 < κ < ∞ be large enough so that κξ φ approximates the borrowing constraint (3, 8).
Planner's problem 3.2.1 Statement
We now study the allocation of a planner who chooses a vector of control variables μ(t, x) to be applied to every agent j ∈ [0, 1] with state dynamics (15). The planner also chooses the vector of aggregate variables Z t given the constraints (22) . The planner chooses the controls and the aggregate variables in order to maximize the discounted aggregate utility
subject to law of motion of the distribution (20, 21) and to the market clearing conditions (22) . Notice the inclusion of the state-dependent Pareto weights ω(t, x). If ω(t, x) = 1 then we have a purely utilitarian social welfare function. Notice also that the planner discounts future utility flows at rate ρ, not at rate (ρ + η) . Notice that J is the optimal value functional as it maps from the space of initial densities f (0, ·) into the real numbers. The planner's problem with heterogeneous agents is an extension of the classical optimal control problem to an infinite dimensional setting, in which the state is the whole distribution of individual states f (t, x). The problem is deterministic, as so is the KF equation.
Solution
We provide necessary conditions to the problem (23).
Proposition 2 (Necessary conditions)
If a solution to problem (23) exists, the optimal value functional J (f (0, ·)) can be expressed as
where j (t, x) is the marginal social value function, which represents the social value of an agent at time t with an state x. The social value function satisfies the HJB
where the Lagrange multipliers λ k (t), k = 1, .., p are given by
The proof can be found in the Appendix C. This proposition is the central result of the paper. It provides a system of partial differential equations consisting of the HJB (25), the KF (20, 21) and the market clearing conditions (22) which link the dynamics of the social value function j, the policies μ, the aggregate variables Z and the distribution f. 18 The Lagrance multipliers in (26) reflect the 'shadow prices' of the market clearing condition. They price, in utility terms, the deviation of an agent from the value of the aggregate variable: g k (x, μ) − Z k . 18 We have implicitly assumed that j ∈ C 2 (Ω) . We do not provide any theoretical result if this is not the case although our numerical procedure is able to accommodate viscosity solutions, as described below.
Notice that the necessary conditions in the planner's problem with ω = 1 are the same as those in the competitive equilibrium, with the exception of the term
in the planner's HJB equation (25) . Therefore, it is trivial to check the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Constrained optimality of the competitive equilibrium) The competitive equilibrium equals the social optimum in the utilitarian sense (ω = 1) if
whereλ k (t) are given bỹ
Notice that we have replaced j(t, x) by V (t, x) in (28), that is, the marginal social value equals the individual value. Therefore, it is enough to solve the competitive equilibrium and to compute (27) to check whether it is socially optimal.
Example 2 In the example of section 2, the HJB equation in the constrained efficient solution is
with the Lagrange multiplier
Notice that equation (29) equals the individual HJB (9) plus λ (a − K) + ηjδ (a + φ) δ (z − z) . The term λ (a − K) reflects the correction in the social value j compared to the individual value V due to the difference between the agent's wealth a and the average K. If the Lagrange multiplier λ is positive, then the social value of wealthy agents is higher than their private value and hence there is capital underaccumulation. If λ is negative, then the private value is higher than the social one and there is capital overaccumulation.
Computational algorithm
In this section we provide a numerical algorithm to solve the planning problem. First we provide a general description and then we solve the example.
General algorithm
The general idea for the solution of infinite-horizon coupled HJB-KF systems is to first solve the steady-state and then iterate backward and forward in time, as described in Achdou et al. (2015) . The approach here is similar, taking into account that the problem is more complicated as we also need to find the value of the time-varying Lagrange multipliers.
Steady-state
The steady-state can be computed using a relaxation algorithm. Given a constant θ ∈ (0, 1), begin with an initial guess of the aggregate variables Z 0 and the Lagrange multipliers λ 0 = 0, set n, m = 0:
1. Given Z n and λ m , solve the HJB equation (25) in the stationary case ( ∂j ∂t = 0) and obtain the social value function j n and the optimal policies μ n .
2. Given the optimal policies μ n solve the KF equation (20) in the stationary case ( ∂f ∂t = 0) and obtain the distribution f n .
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3. Given the optimal policies μ n and the distribution f n , compute the aggregate variablesZ n+1 using the market clearing conditions (22) .
update n := n + 1 and return to step 1.
Computeλ m+1
using the definition (26) . Ifλ n+1 = λ n , set λ n+1 = θλ n+1 + (1 − θ) λ n , update m := m + 1 and return to step 1.
If the algorithm converges, it should produce the steady-state value function j ∞ , the optimal policies μ ∞ , the aggregate variables Z ∞ , the Lagrange multipliers λ ∞ and the distribution f ∞ . 20 19 Achdou et al. (2015) show how the solution of the stationary KF equation just reduces to the inversion of the matrix characterizing the infinitesimal generator of the stochastic process. This is a sparse matrix, which can be inverted using standar numerical techniques. 20 We do not provide any proof of convergence of our numerical algorithm.
Dynamics
In order to solve the dynamics, we guess a time T long enough for the system to converge to the steady-state and then we iterate backward and forthward, taking as given two objects: the steady-state value function j ∞ and the initial distribution f 0 . We begin with an initial path for aggregate variables Z 0 t = Z ∞ , t ∈ [0, T ] and the Lagrange multipliers λ 0 t = λ ∞ . Set n, m = 0 :
1. Given Z n (t) and λ m (t) , solve the HJB equation (25) backward beginning at j T = j ∞ and obtain the social value function j n t and the optimal policies μ n t .
2. Given the optimal policies μ n t solve the KF equation (20) forward beginning at f 0 and obtain the distribution f n t .
3. Given the optimal policies μ n t and the distribution f If the algorithm converges, it should produce the complete dynamics of the system.
The optimal wealth distribution with incomplete markets and stochastic lifetimes
We solve numerically the stationary problem of section 2 using the steady-state algorithm described above. In order to solve the HJB and the KF equations, we employ a finite difference method described in Appendix D. As discussed in Achdou et al. (2015) , the appropriate solution concept of HJB equation with state constraints is that of a "viscosity solution" (Crandall and Lions, 1983; Crandall, Ishii and Lions, 1992) and the proposed finite difference method converges to the unique viscosity solution of this problem (Barles and Souganidis, 1991). The idea of the finite difference method is to approximate the value function V (a, z) and the distribution f (a, z) on a finite grid with steps Δa and Δz and to compute derivatives as differences.
Calibration
Let the unit of time be one year, such that all rates are in annual terms. We assume a long-run growth rate of output, g, of 1 per cent roughly close to the long-run per capita GDP growth in the US economy. We also assume a death rate, η, of 2 percent, equivalent to an average lifetime of 50 years. The capital share parameter, α, is taken to be 0.36 and the depreciation rate of capital, δ K , is 0.10. The borrowing constraint, φ, in our paper is set to 5. This value is chosen such that the right-tail exponent of the distribution ζ, is roughly 1.5, a similar value to that in the United States according to Achdou et al. (2015) . The mean of the income process,ẑ, is set to 1. The calibration of the rest of parameters follows Aiyagari (1994) and Davila et al. (2012) , taking into account that in contrast to both papers we have stochastic lifetimes and long-run growth. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1 γ is set to 0.5 so that the risk aversion is 2. The income process is calibrated to have an autocorrelation of 0.6 and a coefficient of variation, of 0.2, so that θ = 0.4 and σ = 0.2. The subjective discount rate, ρ, is set to 0.01 such that the stationary discount ratê ρ ≡ (ρ + η) − (1 − γ) g is set to 0.04, which is the equivalent concept to the discount rate in the two papers. Finally, in order to solve numerically the model, we employ a grid with 500 points in wealth, ranging from −5 to 200, and 20 points in income, from 0.5 to 1.5. We introduce an upper bound to the wealth distribution of 200, equivalent to around 50 times the average wealth, in order to capture most of the dynamics at the right tail of the distribution. 
Results
The first column in Table 1 displays the steady-state values for the main aggregate variables in the competitive equilibrium. Capital is two and a half times larger than output and the interest rate, r, is 4.45 per cent, a value larger than r * ≡ ρ+γg = 3% in Proposition 1. Notice also that the adjusted interest rate (r − g + η) = 5.45% is larger than the adjusted discount rateρ = 4%, but it poses no problem as agents cannot accumulate wealth indefinitely due to their random deaths. Figure  1 displays the savings policy s(a, z) ≡ (wz + (r − g + η) a − c(a, z)) and the wealth-productivity distribution f (a, z). Notice how, in the case of the distribution, there is a large proportion of the agents at the borrowing limit of −φ = −5 for values of z below 1. By construction the model also replicates the wealth inequality observed in the United States, with an exponent, ζ, around 1.5. 22 21 Result are robust to changes in the size of the domain. 22 The exponent is computed numerically for wealth levels between the first and the last decile of the wealth distribution. The wealth distribution is defined as In order to solve the planner's problem we need to jointly solve the HJB equation (29), the KF equation (10) and the definition of the Lagrange multiplier (30), as described in Appendix D. For the calibration above, the value of λ results in 0.0044. The positiveness of λ implies that the social value of individuals with large wealth is higher than their private value. The second column in Table 1 displays the results in this case. The constrained-efficient allocation features larger levels of output, capital and of the capital-output ratio than the competitive equilibrium. This means that the market economy is undercapitalized compared to the social optimum, which necessarily implies larger levels of savings and lower interest rates in the optimum. The social optimum also features a higher level of wealth inequality with a Pareto exponent of 0.77. 23 Notice that despite the fact that the slope is smaller than one, the wealth distribution has a well-defined mean as it is bounded by a maximum a = 200.
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Figure 2 illustrates how, despite the lower interest rates, savings s(a, z) are higher in the optimal allocation than in the market economy, which explains the lower value of the tail exponent in that case. The bottom line of this analysis is that the reduction in interest rates in the social optimum is not enough to compensate for the increase in aggregate savings by wealthy households, thus resulting in an increase in wealth inequality. This is naturally linked to the fact that the competitive allocation displays less capital than the constrained-efficient allocation, and therefore a larger level of aggregate savings is welfare-improving.
Finally, we compare aggregate welfare in both allocations. Aggregate welfare in the stationary case can be defined as 23 The planning economy also displays a power-law distribution, but with a smaller slope than the competitive equilibrium. 24 This also explains why the interest rate may be larger than g = 1%.
of all agents such that the welfare in both allocations (constrained and competitive) is the same
and hence
that is, there is an average 8.8 percent gain in consumption-equivalent terms in the optimal allocation compared to the market one.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the problem of a planner who controls a population of heterogeneous agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks in order to maximize an optimality criterion related to the distribution of states across agents. If the problem is analyzed in continuous time, the KF equation provides a deterministic law of motion of the entire distribution of state variables across agents. The problem can thus be analyzed as one of deterministic optimal control in which both the control and the state are distributions. If a solution exists, we show how it should satisfy a system of coupled PDEs composed by the planner's HJB and the KF equations. We also introduce a simple criterion to check whether a competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. We provide a numerical algorithm in order to find the solution to the planning problem. As an application, we employ this algorithm to analyze the welfare properties of an Aiyagari economy with stochastic lifetimes. In particular, we analyze the constrained social optimum in which a social planner maximizes the aggregate welfare subject to the same equilibrium budget constraints and competitive price setting as the individual agents. We show how the social optimum features more capital than the market economy. We also show how the level of wealth inequality is higher in the social optimum as the reduction in interest rates due to higher capital is not enough to compensate for the increase in aggregate savings by wealthy households.
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Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof mimics the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 6 in Achdou et al. (2015) . First we show that individual consumption is asymptotically linear in a (as a → ∞) and given by
which has a positive solution as long as ρ + γη − (1 − γ) r > 0. This policy is the solution of the auxiliary problem without labor income, wz, and without borrowing constraint (φ = ∞), characterized by the HJB equation
where V (a) = ρ+γη−(1−γ)r γ −γ a 1−γ 1−γ + κ and κ is a constant.
Second, given the HJB equation (25) , for any
This can be easily verified as V (a, z) = ξ 1−γ V ξ (a/ξ, z),
. Third, notice how in the asymptotic limit lim ξ→∞ V ξ (a, z) = V (a) and lim ξ→∞ c ξ (a, z) = c (a) , the latter given by equation (33). This is equivalent so state that for large a, we have c(a, z) ≈ ρ+γη−(1−γ)r γ a. The stationary KF equation for large a then results in
We may guess and verify that f (a) ∼ a −(1+ζ) and then we get
B. Technical assumptions
These assumptions are adapted from Bensoussan, Chan and Yam (2015). Let P 2 (Ω) be the space of probability measures equipped with the 2 nd Wasserstein metric, W 2 (·, ·) such that for any
where the infimum is taken over the family Γ (υ 1 , υ 2 ) of all joint measures with respective marginals υ 1 and υ 2 . Let m ∈ P 2 (Ω) be such that dm = fdx where f ∈ L 2 (Ω) is a density function given by (20) and dx is the Lebesgue measure in Ω. We can combine the definition of the drift b (x, μ, Z) in (15) with the definition of the aggregate variable Z in (22) and the definition of measure m to represent the drift as b (x, μ, m) . We write
1. Lipschitz continuity. There exists K > 0, such that
2. Linear growth. There exists K > 0, such that
3. Quadratic condition on the objective. There exists K > 0, such that
C. Proof of Proposition 2.
The idea of the proof is to solve problem (23) using differentiation techniques in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
C.1. Mathematic preliminaries
First we need to introduce some mathematical concepts. 25 Let L 2 (Φ) be the space of functions with a square that is Lebesgue-integrable over Φ ⊂ R n . It is a Banach space with the norm
that is, it is a complete normed vector space. In contrast to n-dimensional Banach spaces such as
The space of Lebesgue-integrable functions L 2 (Φ) with the inner product
The assumptions are 25 All the contents here are adapted from texts such as Luenberger (1969) , Brezis (2011) , Gelfand and Fomin (1991) or Sagan (1992).
is a Hilbert space.
An operator T is a mapping from one vector space to another. For example, given the process X t described in (15), its infinitesimal generator A is an operator in L 2 (Φ) defined by (19) . The adjoint operator T * of a linear operator T in a Hilbert space is defined by the equation
there is a constant M such that
The Riesz representation theorem allows us to express functionals as inner products.
Proof. See Brezis (2011, pp. 97-98).
There are two concepts of differentials in Hilbert spaces.
Definition 3 (Gateaux differential) Let J (f ) be a linear continuous functional and let h be arbitrary in L 2 (Φ) . If the limit
exists, it is called the Gateaux differential of J at f with increment h. If the limit (35) exists for each h ∈ L 2 (Φ) , the functional J is said to be Gateaux differentiable at f.
If the limit exists, it can be expressed as δJ (f ; h) = d dα J (f + αh) | α=0 . A more restricted concept is that of the Fréchet differential.
exists δJ (f ; h) which is linear and continuous with respect to h such that
then J is said to be Fréchet differentiable at f and δJ (f ; h) is the Fréchet differential of J at f with increment h.
The following proposition links both concepts.
Proposition 3 If the Fréchet differential of J exists at f , then the Gateaux differential exists at f and they are equal.
Proof. See Luenberger (1969, p. 173) . The familiar technique of maximizing a function of a single variable by ordinary calculus can be extended in infinite dimensional spaces to a similar technique based on more general differentials. We use the term extremum to refer to a maximum or a minimum over any set.
following theorem is the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
Theorem 3 Let J have a Gateaux differential, a necessary condition for J to have an extremum at f is that δJ (f ;
Proof. Luenberger (1969, p. 173), Gelfand and Fomin (1991, pp. 13-14) or Sagan (1992, p. 34).
Finally, we can extend this result to the case of constrained optimization.
Theorem 4 (Lagrange multipliers) Let H be a mapping from L 2 (Φ) into R n . If J has a continuous Fréchet differential, a necessary condition for J to have an extremum at f under the constraint H(f ) = 0 at the function f is that there exists a function λ ∈ L 2 (Φ) such that the
is stationary in f, i.e., δL (f ; h) = 0.
Proof. Luenberger (1969, p. 243).
C.2. Proof of the proposition
Let's define the extended domain Φ ≡ [0, ∞) × Ω The problem of the planner is to maximize
subject to the KF equation (20) − ∂f ∂t
and the market clearing condition (22)
Assuming that the conditions above are satisfied, we can express the Lagrangian functional (36) for this problem as
., p are the Lagrange multipliers.
A necessary condition for [f, μ 1 , .., μ m , Z 1 , .., Z p ] to be a maximum of (38) is that the Gateaux derivative with respect to each of these functions equals zero. It will prove useful to modify the second term in the Lagrangian
where we have integrated by parts with respect to time in the term ∂f ∂t and applied the fact that A * is the adjoint operator of A. The term
, that is, the initial distribution is given.
The Gateaux derivative with respect to f is
and it equals zero according to Theorem 13. As this is satisified for any h(t, x) we obtain that
which is the HJB equation of the planner (25) . The Gateaux derivative with respect to the policy μ j is
where A (μ j +αh) j is
It is trivial to check that (41) is equal to the derivative with respect to μ j in (40):
Finally, the Gateaux derivative with respect to the aggregate variable Z k is
This can be expressed as
As this is satisfied for any h(t), we obtain that
C.3. The social value
Here we show that the Lagrange multiplier j is indeed the social value function, that is, that the functional J (f (0, ·)) can be represented as
First we check that, as long as the weighted instantaneous utility is bounded in Φ :
the functional J is continuous:
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
where m (Φ) is the measure of the domain Φ. We may then apply the Riesz representation theorem:
Now we proceed to show thatj(t, x) = j(t, x). For any initial condition f (t 0 , ·), we have an optimal control path μ and aggregate variables Z. We may apply Bellman's Principle of Optimality:
Let Ξ (μ, f) be defined as
Taking derivatives with respect to time in equation (44) and the limit as t → t 0 :
For the optimal controls and aggregate variables Z the market clearing conditions (37) are also satisfied, so we can add them to the expression above, to obtain:
If we operate on the term (39) and take the Gateaux derivative with respect to f (t, ·) at both sides of the expression (46), we obtain
which is the same expression as (25) . In addition, if we take the Gateaux derivative of (46) with respect to μ (t, ·) and the standard derivative with respect to Z (t) we obtain again the first order conditions (42) and the value of λ k (43). Hencej = j.
D. Description of the numerical algorithm
Step 1: Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The HJB equation is solved by a finite difference scheme following Achdou et al. (2015) . It approximates the value function V (a, z) on a finite grid with steps Δa and Δz : a ∈ {a 1 , ..., a I } , z ∈ {z 1 , ..., z J }. 26 We use the notation V i,j ≡ V (a i , z j ), i = 1, ..., I; j = 1, ..., J. The derivative of V with respect to a can be approximated with either a forward or a backward approximation:
where the decision between one approximation or the other depends on the sign of the savings function s i,j = wz j + ra i − c i,j through an "upwind scheme" described below. The derivative of V with respect to z is approximated using a forward approximation
The HJB equation (25) iŝ Moving all variables with n + 1 superscripts to the left hand side and those with n superscripts to the right hand side:
Δ +ρV Equation (51) is a system of I × J linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:
where the matrix A n and the vectors V n+1 and u n are defined by: 
. . .
. . . is close enough to V n i,j , stop. If not set n := n + 1 and go to step 1.
Step 2: Solution to the Kolmogorov Forward equation
The KF equation is also solved using an upwind finite difference scheme. The equation (6) 
This case is simpler than the previous one, as the problem is linear in f , so no iterative procedure is needed. We use the notation f i,j ≡ f (a i , z j ). The system can be expressed as 
then (56) is also a system of I × J linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as: 27 In optimal planning solution the first element of the matrix B n is 1 Δ +ρ − β 1,1 + χ 1 − η due to the term ηjδ (a + φ) δ (z − z) in equation (29) .
The system can in turn be written as
where A T is the transpose of A = lim n→∞ A n and h is a vector of zeros with a −1 at the first position. We solve the system (57) and obtain a solutionf . Then we renormalize as
